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Abstract 
Ours is age of plurality in all things. Yet, plurality has always been the case: difference, 
diversity, multiplicity – that which tends to disconnectedness in whatever sphere of 
human life – has ever been the lot of humanity. Religion is no exception. Yet while most 
religions would hold that unity – the uniformity and coherence suggestive of an inherent 
connectedness – is a sine qua non, the lived reality of religious people everywhere is 
often the context of, and contention with, a disconnectedness which is consequent upon 
difference of viewpoint, variety of experience, clash of interpretation, and competing 
claims for religious allegiance and identity. This can be the case both within any one 
major religious tradition as well as between them.  
 
Given the ubiquitous nature of religion and the pressing need for improved interreligious 
relations in many parts of the world, the question of how the fact of religious plurality is 
apprehended from within the religions themselves is critical. Naturally every religion 
proffers its own hermeneutic of the religiously „other‟. Typically, this has included 
variations on the themes of exclusivity and inclusiveness. More recently the paradigm of 
pluralism has been advocated as a positive hermeneutic accounting for the fact of 
religious plurality. In this paper I shall engage in a brief analytical discussion of 
exclusivism and inclusivism as models of rejection and incorporation, and then examine 
models of the affirmation of religious plurality by way of the multiple paradigms of 
pluralism.  
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Introduction 
In 1529 the Muslim armies of the Turkish Ottoman Empire were besieging the ancient 
city of Vienna: the enemy was at the gate. And with Vienna being a southern European 
gateway, there was a real sense that the then Islamic enemy was indeed attempting to 
storm the gate of Europe. Of course, in an era when civilisation was by and large 
identified with the city-state, or at least bounded, fortified, gated cities, the phenomenon 
of the enemy being at the gate was by no means an unusual one. Nowadays we don‟t live 
in fortified cities and, attempts at maintaining the integrity of national borders 
notwithstanding, for the most part geographic boundaries demarcating community 
identities are quite porous. In a globalised post-modern age of mass travel, mass 
communication, and the breakdown of homogeneity in favour of increasing diversity in 
almost all things, the notion that there is some kind of “gate” at which an enemy might 
stand is all but meaningless. But not totally; targeting the Twin Towers was the dramatic 
21
st
 century equivalent of the medieval storming of the gates: the great secular city was 
unable to repel the invader; but neither was it overrun. Attacks on embassies, the 
bombing of transport infrastructure, the targeting of locales of commerce and communal 
congregating, are the contemporary equivalents of an enemy assaulting the gate. A sense 
of siege by, once again, an Islamic enemy would seem for contemporary western society 
to be a mark of our age. 
 
Today‟s obvious gateways are international sea- and airports; and all must pass through 
the electronic eye of the needle. At least one nation manifests its sense of being under 
siege in very overt ways. And across America, as well as in many other countries, the 
phenomenon of gated communities – offering some sense of protected space against the 
encroachments of a hostile world – are on the rise. In some cases, such gated 
communities are of a religious ilk: new Christian „Viennas‟ holding the line against an 
ungodly world. Yet we live in a time when great barriers of the past – apartheid, the 
Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain – have crumbled in the face of a relentless drive to 
overcome isolating divisions. But the embrace of isolation has not waned, only shifted 
focus. Withdrawal into laagers of security and the containment of a perceived enemy 
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behind walls of demarcation constitute new and rising phenomena. The embrace of 
isolation calls forth bigger military budgets; it demands tighter border controls; it turns 
the mat of welcome into a barrier of suspicion. And although today, as with Vienna in 
1529, the threatening enemy is identified as Islamic, it is not Islam – or Muslim people 
per se – which is the adversary.  
 
The real problem with which we are all confronted, whether we realise it or not, is the 
perennial – but now urgently pressing – problem of contending with inter-communal 
diversity as such. The real enemy at the gate is the fact of an unresolved contending with 
pluralities of otherness. In particular, it is the plurality of religious identity which, even 
more than ethnic diversity, is arguably the key issue. Religious plurality is often the 
primary factor underlying internal social and inter-communal tension. The truly religious 
terrorist of our time is the one who implacably rejects the pluralist milieu in favour of 
imposing a narrow conformity. So how religious communities within a given society 
contend with the fact of existing within a plurality of alternate religious communities is 
crucial. After all, it is a sine qua non of the secular liberal society that the mutual 
tolerance of religious – and other – differentiations is presupposed. An allied assumption 
is that religious groups within such a society endorse the secular value of mutual 
tolerance. But the reality may not be so simple. So how do – and how may – religious 
communities contend with religious alterity? Every religion has its own interpretation of 
the religiously „other‟ which, until relatively recently, amounted to variations on the 
themes of exclusivity and inclusiveness. Nowadays the paradigm of pluralism has been 
advocated as a positive response to the fact of religious plurality. My intention is to give 
a brief analysis of exclusivism and inclusivism as models of rejection and incorporation 
of plurality, then examine some models of the affirmation of religious plurality. A close 
analysis shows, however, that exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism do not denote three 
discrete paradigms but that each refers, in fact, to a range of sub-paradigms.
1
 
 
                                                 
1 See Douglas Pratt, „Religious Plurality, Referential Realism and Paradigms of Pluralism‟ in Avery Plaw, ed., 
Frontiers of Diversity: Explorations in Contemporary Pluralism. Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2005, 191-209; – 
„Universalising Rhetoric and Particularist Identities: Pluralism and the Future of Our Religious Pasts‟. International 
Journal in the Humanities, Vol. 1, 2003/2004, 1347-1356. 
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Exclusivism: Paradigms of Rejection 
Recent analytical work, in the context of contemporary religiously-driven terrorism, 
shows the presence of a distinctive and rigid form of exclusivity – of actively rejecting 
that which does not conform – being inherent to religious fundamentalism.2 This rise in 
the phenomenon of religious exclusivity – of advocating a form of isolation – can be 
understood as a variant of the paradigm of exclusivism. So what, then, is the paradigm? 
The paradigm of exclusivism amounts to the material identification of a particular 
religion (or form of that religion) with the essence and substance of true universal 
religion as such, thereby excluding all other possibilities to that claim. From this 
viewpoint, the exclusivist‟s religion is the ‘Only Right One’. By its very nature 
exclusivism is hostile to dialogue proper, but it nevertheless impinges on dialogue, most 
often contributing to the undermining of efforts toward it.  
 
The exclusivist affirms identity in a complex world of plurality by a return to the 
firm foundations of his or her own tradition and an emphasis on the distinctive 
identity provided by that tradition….Exclusivism is more than simply a 
conviction about the transformative power of the particular vision one has; it is a 
conviction about its finality and its absolute priority over competing views.
3
 
 
For the exclusivist the mere co-existence of religions is not possible – the natural 
tendency to an exclusive self-assertion predominates.
4
  
 
I suggest the paradigm of exclusivism comes in three variants: open, closed, and extreme 
or „hard-line rejectionist‟. By its very nature exclusivism per se is hostile to any form of 
interreligious dialogue or rapport, yet it nevertheless impinges on interfaith relations, 
most often contributing to outright resistance, or at least the undermining of efforts to 
engage in any form of open relationship. Exclusivism varyingly rejects or devalues the 
                                                 
2 Douglas Pratt, „Religious Fundamentalism: A Paradigm for Terrorism? in Rachel Barrowman, ed., International 
Terrorism: New Zealand Perspectives. Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2005, 
31-52. 
3 Diana L. Eck. Encountering God. A Spiritual Journey from Bozeman to Banares. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993, 174. 
4 Cf. Raymond Panikkar. „The Unknown Christ of Hinduism‟ in John Hick & Brian Hebblethwaite, eds, Christianity 
and Other Religions, London: Collins, 1980, 122-150. 
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„other‟ as other. But there are nuanced variations of the application of the exclusivist 
paradigm which can be identified.  
 
1. An open exclusivism, while maintaining cognitive and salvific superiority, may at 
least be amenably disposed toward the other, if only to allow for – even encourage – the 
capitulation (by way of conversion, for example) of the other. Open exclusivism implies 
openness to some form of relationship with another without expectation of, or openness 
to, consequential or reciprocal change of self-identity with respect to that relationship. An 
„open‟ exclusivism may yet entertain a „dialogue‟ of sorts – perhaps a conversational 
interaction – if only with a view to understanding the perspective of the other in order, 
then, better to refute it and so proclaim the „Only Right One‟ religion. 
 
2. In contrast to open exclusivism, closed exclusivism simply dismisses the „other‟ out of 
hand. Relationship to the „other‟, especially any religious other, is effectively ruled out. 
The „other‟ may be acknowledged as having its rightful place, but that place is inherently 
inferior to that of the closed exclusivist who, inter alia, prefers to remain wholly apart 
from the other. A „closed‟ exclusivism will spurn interaction with another religious 
viewpoint altogether: imperialist assertion is the only mode of communication 
admissible.  
 
3. The third variant is that of extreme exclusivism which marks a shift from the closed 
form understood more simply as the exercise of a right to withdraw into itself, as it were. 
Extreme exclusivism gives expression to hard-line rejectionist exclusivity, the viewpoint 
that asserts an exclusive identity to the extent that the fact and presence of an „other‟ is 
actively resisted, even to the point of taking steps to eliminate the other. The 
distinguishing feature denoting extreme exclusivism is the negative valorising of the 
„other‟ – howsoever defined – with concomitant harsh sanctions and limitations imposed 
upon the other. It is this level of exclusive religion which, in its hostility to „otherness‟, 
inherently invalidates variety. It is this level, or version, of religious exclusivism which 
lies at the heart of so much religious strife – not to mention terrorism and insurgency – 
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and thus poses an acute challenge to those who would advocate religious freedoms, 
toleration, and peaceful co-existence. 
 
Inclusivism: Paradigms of Incorporation 
In general terms I define religious inclusivism as the effective identity of a particular 
religion with the universal, with some allowance made for others. This paradigm suggests 
the „other‟ is included surreptitiously, by being understood as already „anonymously‟ and 
indirectly within the fold of „true religion‟ identified, of course, as being the religion of 
the proponent – the Only Fully Right One. Within Christianity it has been embraced 
formally by the Roman Catholic Church since Vatican II, and it reflects most official 
contemporary Protestant Church positions. However, inclusivism, I suggest, comes in at 
least three variant forms, or at least it displays three variant perspectives of expression 
and self-understanding which I call Gatekeeper, Incognito Ubiquity, and Imperialist 
Inclusivism. 
 
1. Gatekeeper Inclusivism allows for limited particular/universal connections in respect 
of other religions, but the validity of such connections is found only through one religion 
– „mine‟ – as being the point of entrance into the realm of the „Fully Right Religion‟. A 
measure of generosity of heart can be extended inasmuch as the religiously other is 
perceived as not completely beyond the pale: other religions may be said to enjoy a 
measure of veracity, or limited representation, of the Universal Truth. However, even 
these religions must, in some sense, go through the „gate‟ of the inclusive religion to 
obtain full religious or salvific validity. But the governing context is clear and 
unequivocal. The religion of the inclusivist is the only fully right way to salvation; the 
only valid bearer of religious truth as such. It constitutes the gatekeeper wherein, at best, 
others may be admitted to the pen.  
 
2. By way of contrast, what may be termed Incognito Ubiquity Inclusivism allows for 
partial validity (i.e., truth value) as well as partial efficacy (i.e., salvific value) in respect 
of other religions. This is more than a matter of gate-keeping with a generous heart. 
There is a hint of pluralism inasmuch as some theological value is accorded to other 
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religions, but there is no doubt as to how that is contextualised: others are viewed as 
variant and limited expressions of the universal or religious truth that is yet best 
expressed by our Right One. The „our‟, of course, is important: any religion could 
theoretically, if not actually, take this view. Each can view itself as possessing in full that 
which others lack or have but partially.  
 
3. The third variant, Imperialist Inclusivism, allows for the partial truth validity and 
salvific efficacy in respect of others (but only those deemed „authentic‟ religions; all else 
is effectively excluded) in that such others are viewed as either legitimate variant out-
workings, or distorted yet valid versions, of the only comprehensive Right One. That is to 
say, as a sort of advance over the notion that other religions, in some incognito fashion, 
express in part what the inclusive religion has in full, there is in this variant of 
inclusivism an allowance that certain other religions may, indeed, be living out, in an 
authentic way, that which is nevertheless to be found fully in the one comprehensively 
true or right religion. Other religions, at least under certain conditions, are already and 
„anonymously‟ included within the worldview framework of the dominant religion in this 
schema. They enjoy a partial measure of being right, relative to that religion which is, of 
course, fully right. In the end the generic inclusivist stance highlights the basic 
assumption inherited from the exclusivist stance: the total identification of a universal 
value, such as religious truth or salvation, with the particulars of but one religion.  
 
Pluralism: Paradigms of Plurality Affirmation 
Pluralism, broadly speaking, is the stance that embraces the fact of plurality and gives it a 
positive interpretation with a self-reflexive edge. Significantly, pluralism not only affirms 
plurality, it also asserts that any unitary or singular identity within the plural mix needs to 
view itself as, indeed, a part of that mix, not as something which contrasts with it, or 
stands diametrically opposed to it. Any unitary identity, of whatever sort, is to be 
conceived as located necessarily within a pluralist context, and so its very conceptuality 
must take account of that context. This is the situation for Christian denominational 
identity within the context of ecumenism, for example. At the very least the hermeneutic 
of pluralism signals an equalising of value and cognitive status across the substantive 
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plurality. It does not require the abandonment of distinctiveness and uniqueness of 
particulars within that plurality; it does require openness to relativity and relationality, 
including openness to interactive responsiveness, as fundamental components of identity 
and being of singular items within the plural mix. 
 
The essential idea of pluralism, as an ideological or hermeneutical response to the fact of 
plurality, is to posit a multiplicity of particular expressions of that which is deemed to be 
universal, in opposition to the idea that there can only be but one valid or fully valid 
expression of the universal. This means that different religions are equally valid 
expressions of some universal „religious reality‟. Specific religions are co-equally valid 
expressions of some universal notion of „true religion‟. Thus both difference and equality 
are affirmed. Religions are not all the „same‟ – their differences are important; yet 
religions are no better or worse than each other as equally valid expressions of the 
Universal. On this basis, no one religion can lay claim to an objective superiority, or 
superlative congruence with the universal religious reality, in respect to other religions. I 
suggest there are a number of discrete paradigms of pluralism. Some are more obvious 
and well known; others are somewhat novel.
5
 I place them within three sub-set 
categories.  
 
I. Common-point Resolution Pluralism 
This standard definitional paradigm resolves the problematic of diversity by recourse to 
the idea of singular reference point lying at either the beginning or the end of the 
trajectory of religions. The concepts of Common Ground and Common Goal pluralism 
are often assumed to be the substance of religious pluralism as such. They constitute the 
default position that is most often discussed and the basis upon which religious pluralism, 
as an ideological response to plurality, is most often criticized. Let us look at them in 
turn. Common Ground Pluralism, views religious differences, or the variety of religions, 
as Contextualised Variable Expressions of/from a Universal Source: the fundamental idea 
is clear – there is a „common ground‟ of religious „reality‟ from which the different 
                                                 
5 Douglas Pratt, „Pluralism and Interreligious Engagement: The Contexts of Dialogue‟. In David Thomas with Clare 
Amos, eds., A Faithful Presence, essays for Kenneth Cragg, London: Melisende Press, 2003, 402-418. See also: 
Douglas Pratt, „Contextual Paradigms for Interfaith Relations‟. Current Dialogue, No 42, December 2003, 3-9 
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religions of the world derive. John Hick, a leading representative of this view, argues that 
the since the middle of the twentieth century a new consciousness of human existence set 
in one world with many world religions has arisen. New conditions and contexts demand 
new thinking. If our neighbour is someone with whom one can engage in conversation 
and dialogue and, in so engaging, make discoveries about the relativity of values in 
respect of religious identities, then, Hick asks, are members of one religion, Christianity 
for example, demonstrably any better (morally or behaviourally) than members of other 
religions? He draws the conclusion that “it is not possible to establish the unique moral 
superiority of any one of the great world faiths”.6 All religions contain examples of great 
good and of great evil. Says Hick: “We need to compare apples with apples”. Hick‟s 
approach is essentially one of reconciling the aspectival relativism that embraces 
complementary diversity. The variant expressions of divine reality contained within the 
different religions are not necessarily or automatically mutually exclusive, but rather 
necessarily limited, yet complementary, images or manifestations of the divine Reality 
“each expressing some aspect or range of aspects and yet none by itself fully and 
exhaustively corresponding to the infinite nature of the ultimate reality”.7   
 
The second variant within the standard paradigm of pluralism, closely allied to the first, is 
Common Goal Pluralism which holds that religious differences reflect the Variety of 
Salvific Paths leading, or drawn to, the Universal Goal. On this view the key idea is that 
there is a transformative goal that is the end-point of all religions, even though it may be 
differingly expressed (in concert with the narrative tradition within which each religion 
dwells uniquely) and differently attained (again in keeping with the unique 
transformative or salvific narrative of each religion). As Hick remarks, “different 
religions have their different names for God acting savingly towards mankind”.8 Hick 
further suggests that the variant salvific paths of religion indicate that religions 
themselves may be regarded as  
 
                                                 
6 John Hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, London: SCM Press, 1995, 15. 
7 John Hick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, London: SCM Press, 1993, 140. 
8 John Hick, The Myth of God Incarnate, London: SCM Press, 1977, 181. 
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different manifestations to humanity of a yet more ultimate ground of all salvific 
transformation. ... the possibility that an infinite transcendent reality is being 
differently conceived, and therefore differently experienced, and therefore 
differently responded to from within our several religio-cultural ways of being 
human.
9
 
 
Ground and goal, though complementarily linked, are nevertheless two variant paradigms 
of the pluralist hypothesis forming the „standard‟ paradigmatic subset. The fundamental 
ideas are clear – there is a „common ground‟ of religious „reality‟ from which the 
different religions of the world derive; or a transformative „goal‟ that is the end-point of 
all religions, even though it may be differingly expressed and differently attained. 
 
II.  Incommensurable Pluralism 
The second paradigm set expresses the view that there is, in fact no point of 
commensurability between religions; essential differences count decisively against any 
significant point of commonality. This paradigm consists of an extreme definition of 
pluralism. Radically Differentiated Plurality holds that religious differences signal 
Irreconcilable Differentiation of Religious Identities. That is to say, there is no reasonable 
ground to assume a link across religions: their individual, or particular, identities militate 
against any such linkage as inferred by the predominant standard paradigm-set of 
pluralism. What are conveniently called religions cannot be said to be variant examples 
of any single category in the first place. The difference between them is of such a nature 
that, strictly speaking, it is illicit even to consider that there is any point of meaningful 
conceptual contact among the religions. The leading exponent of this variant is the 
American theologian and philosopher John Cobb.
10
 He may be identified as a “pure 
pluralist” for whom religions are not mere variant expressions of the one divine reality, 
but are genuinely plural in respect of the realities they represent. Thus, for example, the 
outcome of dialogical encounter may well be mutual transformation as opposed to mutual 
                                                 
9 Hick, Metaphor, 140. 
10 See for example, John Cobb, Beyond Dialogue. See also Leonard Swidler, John Cobb, et. al, Death or Dialogue? 
London: SCM Press, 1990. 
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reinforcement.
11
 Cobb is suspicious of any organising or categorial terms that might 
prejudge or limit dialogic conversation.  
 
Cobb asserts the need for all traditions, including the Christian, to affirm their unique 
centres of meaning. He protests “that the pretense to stand beyond all traditions and build 
neutrally out of all of them is a delusion” and clearly asserts the uniqueness of his own 
religious tradition – Christianity – but eschews any suggestion that this implies any 
necessary superiority: he argues for “the Christian the rejection of all arrogance, 
exclusivism, and dogmatism in relation to other ways”.12 The attractiveness of this 
paradigm lies in its clear assertion of the individual identity and integrity of the religions: 
none can be adequately interpreted in the terms of another; none can be viewed as in any 
sense subsumed within another. To that extent there is no confusion of dialogical motive. 
But it still rather begs the question that there are some religions – Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, for instance – where historical, if not theological or ideological, linkages 
militate against this paradigm as the most apposite context for the conduct of dialogue. 
 
III. Commensurable Pluralism 
A third sub-set exists alongside the standard and the radical sets of religious pluralism I 
have just outlined, and there are again two variants, namely Complementarity Holistic 
and Dynamic Parallel pluralism.  
 
Complementarity Holistic Pluralism holds that religious differences may be discerned as 
Complementary Particular Expressions which together comprise the Universal Whole. 
The American Catholic scholar, Paul Knitter, exemplifies this category in that he 
proposes an idea of “unitive pluralism”.13 He argues that “in the contemporary pluralistic 
world there cannot be just one religion, but neither can there be many that exist in 
                                                 
11 Cf. S. Wesley Ariarajah, Hindus and Christians: A Century of Protestant Ecumenical Thought. Vol. 5 of Currents of 
Encounter: Studies on the Contact between Christianity and Other Religions, Beliefs and Cultures. Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi; and Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1991, 178. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions, 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985; One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue & Global Responsibility, 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1995. 
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„indifferent tolerance‟.”14 Knitter holds a relational view of truth wherein the differences 
and particularities of religions are reconciled, but not materially equivalent. The plurality 
of religions is not so much a matter of non-competing variant out-workings of a common 
ground or goal, but rather the mutual complementarity of different parts together 
comprising a complex whole. The world‟s religions together comprise the whole of what 
religion is as such. The divine reality encountered and expressed variegatedly in and 
through different religions is not the One Reality behind religions, as it were, but the One 
Reality that is comprised by them all. 
  
In similar fashion Dynamic Parallel Pluralism holds that religious differences are 
perceived as reflecting a parallelism of religious phenomena. This paradigmatic 
perspective may be gleaned from the phenomenological study of religion espoused by 
Ninian Smart and others. The question of commonness of goal or ground, let alone the 
notion of religions as parts that collectively comprise a whole, is not the focus. Rather, 
what is observed as a result of analysis of presented data – the phenomena that together 
comprise any given religion – is the presence of dynamic parallels rather than substantive 
„sameness‟. From observation and concomitant analysis of religions can be discerned a 
number of dynamic parallels that are operative in and through their various narrative 
traditions. For example, all major religions contain a narrative account of an inherent 
less-than-satisfactory state of affairs for human existence, howsoever arrived at in terms 
of specific narratives. In all cases, however, this state of affairs requires some 
transformative action to overcome and so enable the attainment of an ultimate outcome or 
destiny. The stories expressing this vary, as do the doctrines and teachings relating 
thereto. But the dynamics contained within the differing narratives redound with parallel 
similarities.  
 
So, on the basis of this paradigm, religious plurality may be interpreted in such a way as 
to yield points of dynamic commonality that yet preserves the integrity of difference. 
Religions are not variants of the same thing; but they may be understood to variably 
express parallel processes. The inference is that the essence or reality of religion lies in 
                                                 
14 Ariarajah, op. cit., 177. 
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the dynamic processes rather than the veracity or otherwise of commensurable 
substantives.  
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, the paradigms of exclusivism and inclusivism are premised on the 
notion that there is but one universal truth or religion whereby the relationship between 
the universal and specific religions is problematic. Either way it is taken as a sine qua 
non of „universal‟ that there can be only one valid expression of it in terms of particular 
form. Thus the religious exclusivist makes an assumption that his or her religion is, in 
fact, the only universally true one. All others are necessarily false. The exclusivist 
advocates a form of direct isolation: the community of truth versus the communities of 
falsehood. The inclusivist holds views that allow for a measure of universal religious 
truth being found in more than one particular religion, but that, nonetheless, it is his or 
her religion that fully contains, or is the full expression of, the universal truth. The 
inclusivist may appear to have overcome the isolationist tendencies of exclusivism, but in 
fact a form of isolation remains: that of taking a metaphysical, if not also a moral, high-
ground. So the paradigms of both exclusivism and inclusivism are problematic. Does this 
mean pluralism as such offers a way forward? Perhaps, but the paradigms of pluralism 
are no less problematic.  
 
The notion of resolving religious isolationism based on a context of a preconceived 
common-point, be that a common ground Reality or a common salvific goal, seems to be 
somewhat presumptuous as well as cognitively constraining. In the end, this seems 
increasingly to be variants of the inclusivist paradigm, which, as with exclusivism, tends 
more to curtail genuine relational openness than facilitate it. By contrast, the paradigm of 
incommensurable pluralism, that of radically differentiated plurality, would seem to 
signal little point in pursuing interreligious, or inter-communal, relations: a fall-back into 
isolation ensues. But perhaps interreligious engagement based on the interdependent 
paradigm set of complementary holistic pluralism and dynamic parallel pluralism may 
offer a more realistic basis for a way forward in overcoming the potentially deadly effects 
of religious ideological isolationism. The aim of such engagement is not to reconcile 
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perspectives and beliefs across any two or more religions, but to grow in mutual 
understanding and also deeper self-understanding. Because actual religions are very 
different in many respects, neither has an inherent upper hand. Genuine difference and 
distinctiveness can be affirmed, thus there is scope for real advance in mutually beneficial 
and challenging positive interaction.  
 
A number of key questions press upon religions today. To what extent do their ideologies 
and their behaviours collude with, or counter, contemporary withdrawals into 
communities of isolation, withdrawals that can lead to extremism and even terrorism? 
What model is employed to contend with inescapable plurality; the fact of religious 
diversity and difference both within and between religions? How may the religions 
enable the triumph of their own life-affirming values over the contemporary counter-
tendency to arrogant assertions of life-constraining values and ideologies from within 
their ranks? Given the history of mutual misinformation and even outbreak of hostilities 
that has marked much interreligious engagement throughout history and up to the present 
day, and given in particular the contemporary climate of suspicion of things Islamic and 
corresponding Islamic antipathies to many aspects of the secularized West, then pursuing 
an apposite paradigm capable of providing a basis for interreligious engagement in the 
quest for harmonious inter-communal relations and the counter to extremist-fomenting 
isolationism would seem an urgent imperative. 
 
